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Abstract—With increasingly favorable economics and bundling
of different grid services, energy storage systems (ESS) are
expected to play a key role in integrating renewable generation.
This work considers the coordination of ESS owned by customers
located at different buses of a distribution grid. Customers
participate in frequency regulation and experience energy prices
that increase with the total demand. Charging decisions are
coupled across time due to battery dynamics, as well as across
network nodes due to competitive pricing and voltage regulation
constraints. Maximizing the per-user economic benefit while
maintaining voltage magnitudes within allowable limits is posed
here as a network-constrained game. It is analytically shown
that a generalized Nash equilibrium exists and can be expressed
as the minimizer of a convex yet infinite-time horizon aggregate
optimization problem. To obtain a practical solution, a Lyapunov
optimization approach is adopted to design a real-time scheme
offering feasible charging decisions with performance guarantees.
The proposed method improves over the standard Lyapunov
technique via a novel weighting of user costs. By judiciously
exploiting the physical grid response, a distributed implementa-
tion of the real-time solver is also designed. The features of the
novel algorithmic designs are validated using numerical tests on
realistic datasets.
Index Terms—Lyapunov optimization, generalized Nash equi-
librium, power distribution grids, voltage regulation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Energy storage systems (ESS) are expected to lie at the heart
of the smart grid, due to their ability to integrate renewables
and balance energy [1]. Indeed, utility-scale programs for
distributed resources and demand response motivate individual
customers to employ ESS (including electric vehicle (EV) bat-
teries) for arbitrage, peak shaving, and/or frequency regulation.
There is hence a compelling need for ESS control policies to
maximize economic benefits while ensuring grid stability.
Optimal ESS charging schemes can be broadly classified
into offline and online. Offline schemes make decisions be-
forehand by utilizing information about future quantities in
the form of exact values and probabilistic or interval char-
acterizations. An offline worst-case ESS coordination scheme
is developed in [2]. Offline protocols for charging EVs under
network constraints over a finite horizon are studied in [3].
Model predictive control has been also advocated for optimal
ESS charging [4], [5]. A stochastic dynamic programming
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formulation for optimal ESS sizing and control is suggested
in [6], while [7] adopts approximate dynamic programming
to jointly store renewable energy and place day-ahead market
bids. The underlying assumption about availability of future
information renders offline approaches ill-suited for ESS appli-
cations with high uncertainty, whereas dynamic programming
solutions are impractical for multiple networked ESS.
Several real-time ESS coordination methods rely on Lya-
punov optimization, originally developed for handling data
network queues [8]. This technique was first adopted for
real-time energy arbitrage in data centers in [9]. Aiming at
minimizing the average electricity cost over an infinite time
horizon, the derived online scheme yields feasible charg-
ing decisions with provable suboptimality guarantees. The
technique has been extended to cope with battery charging
inefficiencies [10]; towards distributed ESS implementations
involving an aggregator [11]; and for handling the exit/return
dynamics of EVs [12]. The Lyapunov approach has also been
employed for microgrid energy management under network
constraints in [13]. However, the feasibility of the charging
decisions was only numerically demonstrated. A Lyapunov
method for coordinating ESS operating at two timescales
is devised in [14]. The Lyapunov technique has been also
geared towards managing energy storage over a finite time
horizon [15]. The technique has been interpreted as a stochas-
tic dual approximation algorithm; see [16] for an application
to jointly optimize energy storage and load shedding. Built
on competitive analysis, finite time-horizon algorithms have
been suggested for arbitrage using energy storage [17], and
for peak-shaving during electric vehicle charging [18].
The previous approaches presume non-competitive setups.
Nevertheless, ESS are usually owned by separate entities and
charging decisions are mutually coupled due to competitive
pricing or physical network constraints, thus leading naturally
to game theoretic formulations. Reference [19] solves an
offline Stackelberg game for ESS charging under behavioral
constraints. The competitive scenario in which multiple users
aim to minimize their day-ahead cost of operating distributed
generation and storage is analyzed in [20]. Sharing ESS
resources among users has been shown to be beneficial for
arbitrage gains [21]. Sharing storage and renewable resources
have been further studied as coalition games in [22].
This work considers the competitive scenario of optimally
coordinating user-owned ESS sited at different buses of a
distribution grid. The first contribution is to combine Lya-
punov optimization with a game-theoretic setup for solving
an infinite-horizon energy storage problem. As described in
Section II, charging decisions are coupled through voltage
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constraints and a competitive pricing mechanism incorporating
energy charges and frequency regulation benefits. Section III
formulates the ESS coordination task as a voltage-constrained
game. For this game, we show the existence of a generalized
Nash equilibrium that can be found as the minimizer of
an aggregate yet infinite-horizon convex quadratic problem.
Our second contribution is a weighted Lyapunov method
to obtain a real-time, near-optimal solver for the aggregate
problem (Section IV). Section V quantifies the solver’s per-
formance gain over the non-weighted formulation of [15]. It
is additionally proved that, even under voltage constraints,
one can bound the suboptimality and guarantee feasibility
of the obtained charging decisions. As a third contribution
and to protect customer’s privacy, Section VI computes the
charging decisions at each control period in a decentralized
fashion leveraging dual decomposition and the physical system
response. The scheme is numerically tested in Section VII, and
Section VIII concludes the work.
Regarding notation, lower- (upper-) case boldface letters
denote column vectors (matrices). Calligraphic symbols are
reserved for sets. Vectors 0 and 1 are the all-zero and all-one
vectors. Symbol ‖x‖2 is the `2-norm of x and > transposition.
The main symbols are explained in Table I.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a power distribution system serving N electricity
users indexed by n. The system operation is discretized into
periods indexed by t. Let `tn and q
t
n denote respectively the
active and reactive load for user n during period t. For a
compact representation, the loads at period t are collected into
the N -dimensional vectors `t and qt. User loads are assumed
inelastic and bounded within known intervals as
` ≤ `t ≤ ` (1a)
q ≤ qt ≤ q. (1b)
Each user owns an energy storage unit also indexed by
n. The state of charge (SoC) for unit n at the beginning
of slot t is denoted by stn. The energy by which unit n is
charged over period t is denoted by btn, and it is positive
(negative) during (dis)-charging. For simplicity, it is assumed
that energy storage units are ideal (unit efficiency). Moreover,
since distribution grid customers are currently charged only for
active power, energy storage units are assumed to be operated
at unit power factor. Upon stacking {btn, stn}Nn=1 in vectors
(bt, st) accordingly, the battery dynamics are described as
st+1 = st + bt (2a)
s ≤ st ≤ s (2b)
b ≤ bt ≤ b (2c)
where (2b) maintains the SoCs within [s, s], and (2c) imposes
limits on the charging amount. Customers can reduce their
electricity costs by altering their net active power demand
{ptn}Nn=1 using batteries as
pt = `t + bt (3)
where vector pt := [pt1 · · · ptN ]>.
TABLE I
NOMENCLATURE
Symbol Meaning
N number of buses and users
(`tn, q
t
n) (re)active power demand for user n at time t
stn ∈ [sn, sn] SoC and its limits for user n at time t
btn ∈ [bn, bn] charge and its limits for user n at time t
ptn = `
t
n + b
t
n net active power demand for user n at time t
A˜ (A) (reduced) branch-bus incidence matrix
Itm,n current phasor along line (m,n)
P tm,n + jQ
t
m,n complex power along line (m,n)
rm,n + jxm,n impedance of line (m,n)
V tn , v
t
n voltage phasor and its squared magnitude
R,X bus resistance and reactance matrices
α, β voltage regulation limits
ct0 ∈ [c0, c0] base electricity charge and its limits
ctp ∈ [cp, cp] competitive charge and its limits
rt regulation signal
ctr ∈ [cr, cr] regulation price and its limits
f tn(b
t) electricity cost for user n at time t
Fn({bt}) time-averaged electricity cost for user n
f t(bt) aggregate electricity cost at time t
F ({bt}) time-averaged aggregate electricity cost
wn user-specific weight for Lyapunov scheme
γn SoC-shifting parameter for user n
xtn = s
t
n + γn virtual queue for user n at time t
φ,K optimal value and suboptimality gap
xtn = s
t
n + γn virtual queue for user n at time t
δn parameter equal to
sn−sn+bn−bn
gn−gn
cn parameter equal to wnxn − rcr + c0
g
n
parameter equal to c0 +
cp
N
`>1+
cp
N
`n − cr
gn parameter equal to c0 +
cp
N
`
>
1+
cp
N
`n − cr
λn, λn Lagrange multipliers for voltage constraints
ηjλ step-size at gradient ascent iteration j
a total active power demand in dual decomposition
The underlying distribution grid is modeled as a ra-
dial single-phase system represented by the graph G =
({0,N}, E). The substation is indexed by 0 and the remaining
buses comprise the set N := {1, . . . , N}. Each bus hosts one
energy storage unit. The edge set E models distribution lines.
If pin is the parent bus of bus n, the grid is modeled by the
branch flow equations [23]
−ptn =
∑
k∈Cn
P tn,k − P tpin,n + rpin,n|Itpin,n|2 (4a)
−qtn =
∑
k∈Cn
Qtn,k −Qtpin,n + xpin,n|Itpin,n|2 (4b)
|V tn|2 = |V tpin |2 − 2rpin,nP tpin,n − 2xpin,nQtpin,n
+
(
r2pin,n + x
2
pin,n
) |Itpin,n|2 (4c)
where rpin,n + jxpin,n is the impedance of line (pin, n) ∈ E ;
{Itpin,n, P tpin,n, Qtpin,n} is the complex current and the (re)active
power flowing from bus pin to bus n at time t; V tn is the voltage
phasor at bus n; and Cn is the set of children buses for n.
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Equations (4a)–(4b) stem from conservation of power, while
(4c) captures the drop in squared voltage magnitudes along
line (pin, n) [23].
To avoid the nonlinearity in (4c), distribution grids are
oftentimes studied using the linear distribution flow (LDF)
model introduced in [23]. The latter originates upon setting
Itpin,n = 0 for all n in (4). Alternatively, it can be derived using
a first-order Taylor series approximation of power injections
as functions of voltages evaluated at the flat voltage profile
V tn = 1 + j0 for all n [24].
The connectivity of a grid with N buses and L distribution
lines is captured by the branch-bus incidence matrix A˜ ∈
{0,±1}L×(N+1). Matrix A˜ can be partitioned as A˜ = [a0 A].
For a radial grid with L = N , matrix A is square and
invertible. By dropping the last summands in the RHS of (4),
the LDF model can be compactly expressed as [25]
−pt = A>Pt (5a)
−qt = A>Qt (5b)
Avt = 2 dg({rpin,n})Pt + 2 dg({xpin,n})Qt − a0v0 (5c)
where vt := [|V t1 |2 · · · |V tN |2]>; the symbol dg indicates
a diagonal matrix; and v0 = |V t0 |2 is the squared voltage
magnitude at the substation that is maintained constant.
Eliminating (Pt,Qt) from (5) and exploiting the fact that
a0 + A1 = 0 or A−1a0 = −1, the vector vt can be
approximated as [26], [24]
vt ' −Rpt −Xqt + v01 (6)
where 1 is the all-one vector and
R := 2
(
A> dg−1({rpin,n})A
)−1
X := 2
(
A> dg−1({xpin,n})A
)−1
.
Numerical tests report that the approximation errors in voltage
magnitudes introduced by the LDF model of (6) are less than
0.005 pu; see for example [25, Fig. 6], [27].
Because the entries of (R,X) are non-negative for overhead
lines [25], the model in (6) implies that voltage magnitudes
decrease with increasing (pt,qt). Grid standards confine nodal
voltages to be close to v0 [28]. For example, nodal voltages
|V tn| should be within 0.97 and 1.03 pu, implying that vtn =
|V tn|2 ∈ [0.972, 1.032] for all n ∈ N . The latter introduces
linear inequality constraints on power demands as
α1 ≤ −Rpt −Xqt ≤ β1 (7)
where α := 0.972 − v0,pu and β := 1.032 − v0,pu. The
voltage regulation constraints of (7) couple charging decisions
spatially across costumers. Additional network constraints,
such as apparent power limits for lines and (substation)
transformers could be included. It is henceforth assumed these
limits have been taken care of while allocating loads and sizing
transformers, or when the utility grants permission to energy
storage installations. For this reason, the next formulations
focus on voltage regulation constraints. Nevertheless, if flow
limits have to enforced in real time as well, the modification
described later in Remark 3 can be adopted.
The cost of electricity is varying across time and consists
of two components: (i) an energy charge related to real-time
energy prices; and (ii) a balancing charge compensating users
for participating in frequency regulation. In detail, the cost of
electricity for user n at time t is
f tn(b
t
n,b
t
−n) =
(
ct0 + c
t
p
N∑
i=1
pti
)
ptn − rtctrbtn (8)
where bt−n denotes a vector containing the charging decisions
for all but the n-th user.
The first summand in the right-hand side (RHS) of (8)
constitutes the energy charge for user n. Different from [11],
the per-unit price is an affine function of the total demand and
is assumed to be positive for all t: it includes the base charge
ct0 plus the competitive term c
t
p
∑N
i=1 p
t
i. When
∑N
i=1 p
t
i > 0,
the per-unit price increases with increasing net total demand
and users are motivated to reduce consumption and/or inject
energy. When
∑N
i=1 p
t
i < 0, the per-unit price decreases with
increasing energy surplus, thus signaling users to consume.
The demand in the feeder may be partially supplied by the
transmission grid through the substation.
Remark 1. The affine dependence of the electricity price
ct0 + c
t
p
∑N
i=1 p
t
i on the total demand reflects the fact that the
utility participates in a bulk electricity market: higher demand
translates to increasingly higher costs. The regulated scenario
where customers are subjected to fixed pricing can be captured
by setting ctp = 0. Although piecewise-linear pricing could be
accommodated, the exposition is restricted to affine pricing to
avoid mathematical clutter.
The second summand in the RHS of (8) is the balancing
charge defined as the product between the regulation signal
rt; the regulation price ctr; and the battery charge b
t
n. The
regulation signal is issued by the operator: rt = +1 when
there is energy surplus and storage units can only be charged,
and rt = −1 during energy deficit periods when storage units
can only be discharged. Hence, for all n and t
rt = sign(btn). (9)
Due to (9), the regulation benefit rtctrb
t
n = c
t
r|btn| is always
positive, and it can thus reduce the total cost for user n in
(8). Here, prices can vary in an arbitrary manner, they are
bounded within 0 ≤ c0 ≤ ct0 ≤ c0, 0 ≤ cp ≤ ctp ≤ cp and
0 ≤ ct ≤ ctr ≤ cr. The setup where (dis)-charging decisions
do not have to comply with rt as in (9) is treated in Remark 4.
III. A GAME-THEORETIC PERSPECTIVE
Due to the coupling between the users’ decisions, mini-
mizing the electricity costs for all users constitutes a voltage-
constrained non-cooperative game [29]. Each user n seeks to
minimize its time-averaged expected electricity cost
Fn({btn,bt−n}) = lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E[f tn(btn,bt−n)] (10)
where E is the expectation over the involved random variables
{rt, ct0, ctp, ctr, `t,qt}Tt=1. Then, user n would like to solve the
infinite-horizon problem
min
{btn,stn}
Fn({btn,bt−n}) (11a)
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s.t. ptn = `
t
n + b
t
n (11b)
st+1n = s
t
n + b
t
n (11c)
sn ≤ stn ≤ sn (11d)
bn ≤ btn ≤ bn (11e)
(7), (9). (11f)
Since the instantaneous costs f tn in (8) depend on the total
demand, the average costs {Fn}Nn=1 depend on the decisions
of all users. The optimal charging decisions are further coupled
through the voltage regulation constraints in (7), thus rendering
(11) a generalized Nash game [30]. Formally, we define the
game in its strategic form with its set of users N ; their costs
{Fn}Nn=1; and the space of feasible (satisfying (7)) strategies
B. The feasible strategies for user n can now be defined as
Bn({bt−n}) := {{btn} : {btn,bt−n} ∈ B}.
A sequence of charging decisions {b˜t} constitutes a gener-
alized Nash equilibrium (GNE) if it solves simultaneously the
N coupled minimizations in (11). Hence, a GNE is a feasible
strategy minimizing the per-user cost as long as the remaining
users maintain their strategies, that is for all n,
Fn({b˜tn, b˜t−n}) ≤ Fn({b˘tn, b˜t−n}), ∀b˘tn ∈ Bn({b˜t−n}). (12)
A GNE may not necessarily exist. Even if it does, finding
it is not always computationally tractable [30]. To prove that
a GNE exists for the proposed game and devise algorithms
for finding a GNE, we will next transform the set of per-
user minimizations in (11) into a single minimization. The
minimizer of this aggregate problem is a GNE for (11).
To this end, we first introduce two auxiliary functions. The
first function is the aggregate cost at time t
f t(bt) :=
ctp
2
(
N∑
n=1
ptn
)2
+
N∑
n=1
[
ct0p
t
n +
ctp (p
t
n)
2
2
− rtctrbtn
]
= ct01
>pt +
ctp
2
(pt)>
(
I+ 11>
)
(pt)− rtctr1>bt.
The function f t(bt) is not the sum of the per-user costs
{f tn(bt)}Nn=1, but has been constructed so that for all n
[∇f t(bt)]n = ∂f
t
n(b
t)
∂btn
(13a)
[∇2f t(bt)]n,n = ∂
2f tn(b
t)
∂(btn)
2
. (13b)
Using (13) in the second-order Taylor series expansion of the
quadratic functions f t(bt) and f tn(b
t) yields the key property
f t(bt)− f t(b˘tn,bt−n) = f tn(bt)− f tn(b˘tn,bt−n). (14)
The second function is the time-averaged aggregate cost
F ({bt}) := lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E[f t(bt)]. (15)
Again, the function F ({bt}) is not the sum of
{Fn({bt})}Nn=1; but it satisfies
F ({bt})−F ({b˘tn,bt−n}) = Fn({bt})−Fn({b˘tn,bt−n}) (16)
for all n. The property in (16) follows easily from (14). In
essence F ({bt}) is the exact potential function for (11), which
casts the game as a generalized potential game [31].
Consider next the convex minimization problem
φ˜ := min
{bt}
F ({bt}) (17)
s.to (2), (3), (7), (9).
Problem (17) relates to the original problem in (11) as follows.
Proposition 1. The minimizer {b˜t} of (17) is a GNE for (11).
Proof: Because f t(bt) is quadratic in terms of bt with
a strictly positive definite Hessian matrix
ctp
2
(
I+ 11>
)
, it is
strictly convex. Strict convexity carries over to F ({bt}). Since
the constraints are linear, the optimization in (17) enjoys a
unique minimizer {b˜t} satisfying
F ({b˜t}) < F ({b˘tn, b˜t−n}) (18)
for all b˘tn ∈ Bn({b˜t−n}) with b˘tn 6= b˜tn and n ∈ N .
Using (16) in (18) yields for all n ∈ N
Fn({b˜t}) < Fn({b˘tn, b˜t−n}) (19)
thus proving that {b˜t} is a GNE [cf. (12)].
Remark 2. Consider the special case in which each cost f tn
depends only on btn; e.g., c
t
p = 0 in (8). Then, the exact
potential function for (11) can be formulated as the sum of
the per-user costs, i.e., F ({bt}) = ∑Nn=1 Fn({btn}). In this
case, a minimizer of (17) is not only a GNE for (11), but also
its social-welfare solution.
Proposition 1 asserts that identifying a GNE amounts to
solving (17). Since users lack information on the distribution
network, problem (17) can be solved centrally by an aggre-
gator. Albeit convex, the minimization in (17) is challenging:
Decisions are coupled over the infinite time horizon via (2a)–
(2b), and across grid buses via (7). Further, coping with the
expected electricity cost requires knowing the joint probability
density function of {rt, ct0, ctp, ctr, `t,qt}. Similar problems
are oftentimes tackled through approximate dynamic program-
ming schemes, which are computationally intense [32]. Lever-
aging Lyapunov-based optimization and dual decomposition,
a near-optimal real-time solver is put forth next.
IV. A REAL-TIME SOLVER
To devise a real-time solver for (17), consider the problem
φ′ := min
{bt}∈B
F ({bt}) (20a)
s.to (2c), (3), (7), (9) (20b)
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E
[
btn
]
= 0, ∀n ∈ N . (20c)
Problem (20) is derived from (17) by replacing (2a)–(2b) by
the constraint (20c) on the expected time-averaged battery
charging. In fact, every charging sequence {bt} complying
with (2a)–(2b) satisfies also (20c); see [9], [10], or [16] for a
proof. Hence, the minimization in (20) is a relaxation of the
optimization problem in (17).
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We next adopt the Lyapunov-based techniques of [8] to
devise a real-time approximate solver for the relaxed problem
in (20). This solver outputs charging decisions {bˆt} attaining
the objective value φˆ := F ({bˆt}). In Section V, we will show
that φˆ is -suboptimal for the relaxed problem in (20) and
that {bˆt} is feasible not only for (20), but also for (17). This
implies that
φ˜ ≤ φˆ ≤ φ′ +  ≤ φ˜+ . (21)
In other words, the approximate solver of (20) achieves
bounded suboptimality for (17). The bounds in (21) refer
to F ({bˆt}) and not to Fn({bˆt})’s. We will show that the
sequence {bˆt} lies within bounded average distance from
{b˜t}, which is the minimizer of (17) and the GNEP for (11).
To proceed with establishing the previous claims, Lyapunov
optimization introduces virtual queues and then stabilizes them
to satisfy the average constraint in (20c) [8]. For each user n,
introduce a parameter γn and define the virtual queue as
xtn := s
t
n + γn. (22)
Define also the weighted Lyapunov function as
Lt :=
1
2
N∑
n=1
wn(x
t
n)
2 (23)
where {wn}Nn=1 are positive weights we introduce to handle
the heterogeneous capacities and charging rates across energy
storage units. Parameters {γn, wn} are stacked in vectors
γ and w. Next, we derive upper bounds on the expected
differences of successive Lt’s given the values of virtual
queues collected in vector xt. These upper bounds will help
us later quantify the performance of real-time solvers.
Lemma 1. The drift function ∆t := E
[
Lt+1 − Lt|xt] is
upper bounded by
∆t ≤ E
[
N∑
n=1
wnx
t
nb
t
n|xt
]
+
1
2
N∑
n=1
wn max{b2n, b2n}. (24)
Proof: Being a shifted version of stn, the queue x
t
n evolves
similarly to (2a) as xt+1n = x
t
n + b
t
n. By substituting these
queue dynamics in the definition of ∆t, we get
∆t = E
[
1
2
N∑
n=1
wn
(
2xtnb
t
n + (b
t
n)
2
)
|xt
]
.
The bound in (24) follows since (2c) implies (btn)
2 ≤
max{b2n, b2n} for all n.
Lyapunov optimization derives an approximate yet real-time
solution for (20) by minimizing the instantaneous cost f t(bt)
plus the upper bound on ∆t provided by Lemma 1:
bˆt := arg min
bt
N∑
n=1
wnx
t
nb
t
n + f
t(bt) (25)
s.t. (2c), (3), (7), (9).
Although the average constraint (20c) does not appear in (25),
it is implicitly enforced upon convergence [8]. It is worth
stressing that (25) depends solely on the current realization of
xt and {rt, ct0, ctp, ctr, `t,qt} to find the charging decision bˆt.
It can thus be implemented in real time. The minimization in
(25) depends on the parameters (γ,w), and does not enforce
the SoC constraints of (2b). By properly designing (γ,w), the
next section optimizes the performance of the real-time solver
and guarantees that SoCs remain within limits.
Remark 3. Power flows may be restricted by transformer
ratings and line thermal limits. These constraints can be
readily included in the all the preceding minimizations, that is
(11), (17), (20), and (25). In this case, the charging decisions
obtained from (25) may not yield realizable SoCs. This issue
can be easily resolved if together with the line flow constraints,
the SoC constraints sn ≤ stn+btn ≤ sn are added to (25); note
that stn is known at time t. By doing so, the updated s
t+1
n ’s
remain within limits. Although this simple adaptation of (25)
yields implementable charging decisions, its performance is
not necessarily characterized by the analysis of Section V.
Remark 4. An argument similar to Remark 3 holds for
constraint (9). If the energy storage units do not have to
comply with the (dis)-charging signal rt, problem (25) can be
solved upon dropping (9) and appending the SoC constraints
sn ≤ stn + btn ≤ sn. In this case, if rt = +1 and bˆtn < 0 at
time t, user n experiences the regulation penalty of rtctr bˆ
t
n,
and the suboptimality bound of Section V may not hold.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE REAL-TIME SOLVER
Next, we show that the charging decisions obtained by the
real-time solver of (25) are: (i) feasible for the non-relaxed
aggregate problem in (17); and (ii) within bounded distance
both in terms of the optimal cost for (17) and the GNE
decisions of (11). The analysis extends the results of [9] to
the networked ESS setup and relies on two assumptions:
(a1) For energy storage unit n ∈ N , its capacity and charge
limits satisfy sn − sn > bn − bn.
(a2) In absence of energy storage, the (re)active loads
(`t,qt) can be served without violating the voltage regulation
limits, that is α1 ≤ −R`t −Xqt ≤ β1.
Assumption (a1) essentially excludes fast-charging energy
storage units and is commonly adopted in energy storage
coordination [10], [11], [16]. If sn = 0 and bn = −bn, this
assumption implies that 2bn < sn, or that it takes more than
two periods for an empty battery to be fully charged. This is
reasonable if one considers a Tesla supercharger, which can
fully charge an EV battery within an hour, participating in
a real-time energy market with a control period of 5 or 10
minutes as tested in Section VII.
Assumption (a2) complies with the assumption that energy
storage units do not serve voltage regulation purposes. Exclud-
ing energy storage, nodal voltages can be maintained within
limits through inverters in solar panels or conventional voltage
regulation equipment (regulators, capacitor banks). Although
energy storage units do not participate in voltage regulation,
they do not incur voltage deviations since the problem in (25)
enforces (7) among its constraints. Albeit useful analytically,
Section VII includes tests where (a2) is not met.
The SoCs sˆt+1 = sˆt + bˆt corresponding to the decisions
{bˆt} obtained from (25) are not explicitly constrained within
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[s, s]. This property makes it possible to solve (25) in real time.
By properly designing the parameters (γ,w), the minimizers
of (25) will be shown to be feasible for (17). The next property
is the key ingredient to that end and is shown in the appendix.
Theorem 1. Under (a2), the minimizer bˆt of (25) satisfies
(a) If xtn +
g
n
wn
≥ 0 and rt > 0, then bˆtn = 0;
(b) If xtn +
gn
wn
≤ 0 and rt < 0, then bˆtn = 0;
for all n ∈ N , and where g
n
:= c0 +
cp
N `
>1+
cp
N `n− cr and
gn := c0 +
cp
N `
>
1+
cp
N `n + cr.
Building on Theorem 1, the minimizer bˆt is next shown to
yield feasible states of charge, i.e., sˆt ∈ [s, s].
Theorem 2. Under (a1), the minimizer bˆt of (25) is also
feasible for (17) when (γ,w) satisfy
wnδn ≥ 1 (26a)
− gn
wn
+ bn − sn ≤ γn ≤ − gn
wn
+ bn − sn (26b)
where δn := (sn−sn+bn−bn)/(gn−gn) > 0 for all n ∈ N .
Theorem 2, which is proved in the appendix, asserts that
although the complicating time-coupling constraint sˆt ∈ [s, s]
has been dropped from (25), it is actually satisfied by proper
parameter tuning. Then, the real-time decisions bˆt are feasible
for the offline aggregate problem in (17). Being the minimizer
of (25), the sequence bˆt is not necessarily the minimizer of
(17). Nonetheless, it is shown next that {bˆt} features bounded
suboptimality. The ensuing lemma will be needed.
Lemma 2 ([8]). If {rt, ct0, ctp, ctr, `t,qt} are independent and
identically distributed (iid) over time, there exists a stationary
policy, i.e., a policy selecting b`t based only on the current re-
alizations of the involved random variables. This policy further
satisfies (2c), (3), (9), (7), E[b`t] = 0, and E[f t(b`t)] = φ˜.
Using Lemma 2, it is shown in the appendix that the
average aggregate cost attained by the real-time decisions
φˆ := F ({bˆt}) satisfies the ensuing suboptimality claim.
Theorem 3. If {rt, ct0, ctp, ctr, `t,qt} are iid, it holds that
φ˜ ≤ φˆ ≤ φ˜+K (27)
where K := 12
∑N
n=1 wn max{b
2
n, b
2
n}.
Due to the quadratic cost, the suboptimality bound in terms
of the cost is translated to a suboptimality bound on charging
decisions as proved in the appendix.
Theorem 4. Let {bˆt} be the minimizer of (25), and {b˜t} the
minimizer of (17) that is also the sought GNE. Then,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E[‖bˆt − b˜t‖22] ≤
2K
cp
.
Theorem 4 guarantees that the obtained charging decisions
lie close to the GNE decisions, thus providing a sense of
satisfaction among users. Based on the suboptimality bounds
provided by Theorems 3 and 4, the performance of the real-
time solver can be optimized by minimizing the quantity
K over the weights w subject to wnδn ≥ 1 for all n ∈
N [cf. (26a)]. Since K is separable over {wn}, the optimal
weights are simply w?n := δ
−1
n . Moreover, by plugging {w?n}
into (26b), it is not hard to verify that its leftmost and rightmost
sides coincide. Then, the allowable range for each γn collapses
to a single value.
Corollary 1. To minimize the suboptimality bound and guar-
antee feasibility of the SoC variables, the parameters {γ,w}
in (25) should be selected for all n ∈ N as
w?n := δ
−1
n (28a)
γ?n := −
gn(sn − bn)− gn(sn − bn)
gn − gn
> 0. (28b)
The suboptimality bound becomes K? :=
∑N
n=1
max{b2n,b2n}
2δn
.
Corollary 1 sets the values for parameters {γ,w} in (25).
Since sn − bn > sn − bn by assumption (a1), it follows that
γ?n > sn − bn ≥ 0. Corollary 1 further justifies having user-
specific weights {wn} in (25): The standard non-weighted
Lyapunov technique of [9] would have resulted in a common
weight for all n
wnw = δ
−1
min (29)
where δmin := min δn.1 The weight wnw guarantees there exist
{γn} satisfying (26b) and attaining suboptimality gap
K ′ :=
1
2δmin
N∑
n=1
max{b2n, b2n} ≥ K?. (30)
Rather than having the user with the smallest δn controlling
the algorithm performance, the weights in (25) account for
heterogeneity across energy storage units.
VI. DISTRIBUTED IMPLEMENTATION
The minimization in (25) can be performed in a cen-
tralized fashion using standard (e.g., interior point-based) or
customized solvers for linearly-constrained convex quadratic
programs. In that case however, the limits (s, s,b,b) along
with the sequences {`t,qt, st} need to be communicated from
the users to the aggregator. To waive possible concerns on user
privacy, a distributed scheme for tackling (25) is proposed
next. To simplify notation, the superscript t will be dropped.
Let us first rewrite (25) in the equivalent form
min
b,a
N∑
n=1
[
cnbn +
cp
2
(bn + `n)
2
]
+
cp
2
a2 (31a)
s.to
(1− r)bn
2
≤ bn ≤ (1 + r)bn
2
, ∀n (31b)
a = 1>(b+ `) (31c)
α1 ≤ −R(b+ `)−Xq ≤ β1 (31d)
where cn := wnxn − rcr + c0. Note that variable p = b+ `
has been eliminated; the constraint (31b) combines (2c) and
(9); the new variable a captures the net active power demand
through (31c); and (31d) enforces voltage regulation.
1In fact, instead of weighting the first summand in the cost of (25) by wnw,
[9] would equivalently multiply its second summand by µ = w−1nw = δmin.
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Algorithm 1 Distributed solver for (25) at time t.
1: Aggregator initializes dual variables (νt,0,λt,0,λ
t,0
).
2: Aggregator observes {ct0, ctp, ctr}.
3: Aggregator estimates R`t +Xqt as vt − v01−Rbˆt−1.
4: Each user n observes {rt, ct0, ctp, ctr, `tn}.
5: for j = 0, 1, . . . , do
6: Aggregator communicates to users the entries of
λ˜
t,j
:= R(λt,j − λt,j)− νt,j1.
7: User n updates bt,jn via (35) and communicates it back
to the aggregator.
8: Net load 1>` is communicated to the aggregator.
9: Aggregator updates primal variable at,j from (33).
10: Aggregator updates multipliers (νt,j ,λt,j ,λ
t,j
) by (32).
11: end for
To derive a decentralized solver, we adopt dual decom-
position and introduce Lagrange multipliers ν and λ ≥ 0
(λ ≥ 0) for constraint (31c) and the left-hand (right-hand)
side of (31d), respectively. Dual decomposition updates these
Lagrange multipliers through the projected gradient ascent
iterations [33, Ch. 6]
νj+1 = νj + ηjν
[
aj − 1>(bj + `)] (32a)
λj+1 = max
{
λj + ηjλ
[
R(bj + `) +Xq+ α1
]
,0
}
(32b)
λ
j+1
= max
{
λ
j − ηjλ
[
R(bj + `) +Xq+ β1
]
,0
}
(32c)
where ηjν , η
j
λ > 0 are step sizes; the maximum operator is
applied entrywise; and (aj ,bj) are the minimizers of the
Lagrangian function associated with the minimization in (31)
evaluated at (νj ,λj ,λ
j
). The primal variable aj can be found
by the aggregator in closed-form as
aj = arg min
a
{cp
2
a2 + νja
}
= −ν
j
cp
. (33)
Let λ˜
j
:= R(λj −λj)− νj1. Then, the charging decisions at
iteration j can be updated separately over users by solving
bjn := arg min
bn
cp
2
(bn + `n)
2 + (cn + λ˜
j
n)bn (34)
s.to
(
1− r
2
)
bn ≤ bn ≤
(
1 + r
2
)
bn.
The minimizer of (34) can be readily found in closed form as
bjn =
[
−cn + λ˜
j
n
cp
− `n
](1+r)bn/2
(1−r)bn/2
(35)
where the [x]ba := max{min{x, b}, a} projects x onto the
interval [a, b]. Given the strict convexity of the objective in
(25), the iterations in (32)–(35) are guaranteed to converge to
the optimal dual and primal variables [33]. The steps involved
for solving (25) at time t are tabulated as Algorithm 1.
To update the dual variables in (32), the aggregator needs
to know R`t +Xqt and 1>`t. Given (6), the former can be
calculated indirectly as R`t + Xqt = vt − v01 − Rbˆt−1
assuming the previous charging decisions bˆt−1 persist at
the beginning of period t and that the aggregator measures
vt. Calculating 1>`t can also be performed without sending
private information to the aggregator. Instead, the total load
1>`t can be computed by having nodes communicating over
a spanning tree rooted at the aggregator. Leaf nodes pass
their load values to their parents, their parents sum up the
received information and their own load, and the recursion
proceeds. The communication tree does not necessarily match
the electric grid and can be randomized at each time.
Due to the way optimal weights wn’s are determined in
Remark 1, the users do not need to communicate their δn
or wn to the aggregator. This is an added advantage of our
weighted Lyapunov optimization method over the conventional
one where δn’s have to be shared to identify δmin.
VII. NUMERICAL TESTS
To recapitulate, each user would ideally like to reach the
generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) obtained by solving (11).
Given its stochastic and infinite-time horizon nature, solving
(11), or even obtaining its optimal value φ˜ is computationally
intractable. Theorem 4 though ensured that the decisions
obtained by (25) lie close to the GNE with the distance being
proportional to the suboptimality gap (φˆ − φ˜). This section
evaluates different real-time charging schemes based on the
objective value φ := F ({bt}) they attain. This is because if
a sequence {bt} yields smaller φ, this sequence lies closer to
the sought GNE {b˜t}, which is impossible to compute.
The developed charging schemes were evaluated using load
data from the Pecan Street project comprising both consump-
tion and solar generation [34]. Lacking reactive injections,
a lagging power factor of 0.9 was assumed. Five minute
averages were obtained from the minute-based load data. The
so obtained load data were placed on the IEEE 13-bus and
34-bus feeders along with energy storage units. Both feeders
were converted to single-phase grids as described in [35].
Voltage deviations were allowed to lie within ±1% by setting
α = −0.0199 and β = 0.020 in (7).
The developed Lyapunov-based algorithm was compared
against two competing alternatives. The first alternative is a
standard Lyapunov-based algorithm. Both the developed and
the standard (non-weighted) Lyapunov schemes were operated
for the parameter values minimizing the related suboptimality
gaps [cf. (28) and (29)]. The second alternative is the greedy
charging scheme
min
bt
f t(bt) (36)
s.t. (2), (3), (7), (9)
which can be implemented in real time similar to (25).
Different from (25) though, the problem in (36) involves only
the instantaneous cost f t, and it explicitly enforces the SoC
constraints (2a)–(2b). Since by using {γ?,w?}, the minimizer
of (25) also satisfies (2a)–(2b), the only difference between
(25) and (36) ends up being their costs. When stn is large, the
extra term wnxtnb
t
n in the cost of (25) becomes larger (recall
xtn = s
t
n + γn) hence promoting smaller charging amounts
bˆtn for the same values of {ct0, ctr, ctp, rt}. In other words, the
greedy scheme selects the currently optimal decision, whereas
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Fig. 1. IEEE 13-bus feeder for Scenario 1: battery capacities and charging
rates are indicated as (sn, bn) in 10−1 and 10−2 kWh, accordingly.
(25) takes into account the current price along with the current
SoC. For example, the scheme of (25) requires higher financial
benefit to decide to charge an almost full battery.
To showcase the superiority of the Lyapunov scheme over
the greedy approach, we first tested the costs attained for the
synthetically generated pricing and regulation signals shown
in Fig. 2. According to this setup named Scenario 1, the values
for rt were oscillating between {±1} every 15 slots, and the
prices {Nctp, ct0, ctr} were oscillating between {5, 20} $/unit
with the former lasting for 10 slots and the latter for 5. Homes
from the Pecan Street project with data identifiers 93, 171, 187,
252, 370, 545, 555, 585, 624, 744, 861, and 890 were placed
on the buses of the IEEE 13-bus feeder of Fig. 1. Further, we
set bn = −bn and sn = 0 for all n. The average aggregate
costs attained are depicted in Figure 3, where the weighted
Lyapunov-based scheme clearly outperforms the greedy one.
This is because the greedy scheme (dis)-charges the energy
storage units myopically to their capacities during the low
price of $5/unit, rather than waiting to reap maximum rewards
at $20/unit. The Lyapunov scheme on the other hand saves
some storage capacity for later opportunities.
To simulate a more realistic setup termed Scenario 2 was
tested. Under Scenario 2, the price ct0 was set to the hourly
real-time locational marginal prices for the RTO hub in the
PJM market for 2011. Hourly prices were repeated 12 times
to yield 5-minute prices. The coefficient ctp was selected as
ctp =
ct0
N . Similarly, the price c
t
r was set to the PJM regulation
market clearing price for the same year, while the regulation
signal rt was modeled as a zero-mean {±1} Bernoulli random
variable capturing the nature of actual frequency regulation
signals. The (dis)-charging rates were decreased by a factor
of 16 compared to Scenario 1.
To demonstrate the convergence of Algorithm 1, Figure 4
shows the primal and dual variables corresponding to bus 5.
During this period, the under-voltage constraint of (7) was
active, thus yielding λ5 > 0. Using the diminishing step-size
sequences ηjν = 3·106/(j+1) and ηjν = 2/(j+1), convergence
was achieved within 30 iterations.
Figure 5 shows the time-averaged cost of (17) obtained by
the different schemes. The results indicate that the developed
real-time solver outperforms both alternatives. Its superiority
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Fig. 2. Synthetic regulation signal rt (top) and prices {ct0, ctp, ctr} (bottom)
for Scenario 1.
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Fig. 3. Comparison of average costs for Scenario 1.
over (36) is attributed to the myopic nature of the greedy
scheme as discussed earlier. The improvement of our scheme
over the standard Lyapunov approach is explained by the
enhanced suboptimality gap of (30). The larger suboptimality
gap of the non-weighted scheme has been explained in the
paragraph after Remark 1. Scenario 2 was also tested under
the setup of Remark 4, where charging decisions do not
have to align with the regulation signal rt. Even after this
modification, approximately 85% of the charging decisions
still aligned with (9), and the SOCs always respected (2a). The
developed real-time solver still outperformed its alternatives as
validated in Fig. 6.
Finally, to study its scalability, the proposed scheme was
tested on the IEEE 34-bus feeder shown in Fig. 7. For this
setup named Scenario 3, load data from the Pecan Street
project were mapped to the feeder buses according to Table II.
The energy storage parameters were set as bn = sn/100,
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Fig. 4. Convergence of primal and dual variables for bus 5.
Fig. 5. Averaged f t attained by different charging schemes for Scenario 2.
bn = −bn, and sn = 0 for all n. Tests were carried out using
MATLAB R2016a on a 64-bit Windows 10 PC powered by a
2.6 GHz Intel i7-6700HQ CPU and 12 GB DDR3 RAM. The
attained averaged costs are shown in Fig. 8. The distributed
implementation of Section VI was timed against solving (25)
using YALMIP and the SeDuMi solver [36], [37]. The off-the-
shelf solver ran for 430 sec, while the distributed algorithm
needed only 10 sec.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
A novel approach combining game theory with Lyapunov
optimization has been put forth to analyze competitive energy
storage problems. A generalized Nash equilibrium has been
shown to exist and can be found through a potential func-
tion. Leveraging Lyapunov optimization, a real-time scheme
offering feasible charging decisions with suboptimality guar-
antees has been devised. The suggested decentralized imple-
mentation utilizes the distribution grid response and protects
user’s privacy. Numerical tests using realistic datasets have
demonstrated the convergence of the distributed solver and
the performance gain of the real-time scheme over its non-
weighted counterpart and a greedy alternative. Extending our
solvers to exact grid models and demand-response setups;
considering multi-phase networks; including thermostatically-
controlled loads; and incorporating partial information on
future loads and prices form pertinent open research topics.
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1: Arguing by contradiction, assume
that hypothesis (a) holds for user n yet bˆtn > 0. The case bˆ
t
n <
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Fig. 6. Averaged f t attained for Scenario 2 upon relaxing (9).
Fig. 7. IEEE 34-bus feeder for Scenario 3.
0 is excluded because rt > 0 is assumed. Construct vector bˇt
with bˇtn = 0 and bˇ
t
i = bˆ
t
i for all i 6= n. Under Assumption
(a2) and because matrix R has non-negative entries, if bˆt is
feasible for (25), then bˇt is also feasible.
It will be next shown that bˇt attains an objective value for
(25) smaller than or equal to the one attained by bˆt, that is
N∑
n=1
wnx
t
nbˇ
t
n + f
t(bˇt) ≤
N∑
n=1
wnx
t
nbˆ
t
n + f
t(bˆt). (37)
To this end, the difference of the upper bound values attained
by bˆt and bˇt is
∑N
n=1 wnx
t
n(bˆ
t
n − bˇtn) = bˆtnwnxtn, while the
difference of the instantaneous costs can be shown to be
f t(bˆt)− f t(bˇt) = bˆtn
[
ct0 + c
t
p
N∑
i=1
(bˆti + `
t
i) + c
t
p`
t
n − ctr
]
.
Given bˆtn > 0, the inequality in (37) holds only if
wnx
t
n + c
t
0 + c
t
p
N∑
i=1
(bˆti + `
t
i) + c
t
p`
t
n − ctr ≥ 0. (38)
Observe that bˆt ≥ 0 since rt > 0; loads are lower bounded by
`t ≥ ` from (1a); and prices ctp and ctr are bounded too. Then,
the minimum value for ct0+c
t
p
∑N
i=1(bˆ
t
i+`
t
i)+c
t
p`
t
n−ctr is gn
by definition, and the hypothesis in (a) implies that (38) holds
true. It has been shown that bˇt yields the same or a lower
cost than the unique minimizer bˆt of (25) does. The latter is
a contradiction and proves the claim. Claim (b) can be shown
in a similar fashion.
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TABLE II
PLACING LOAD DATA ON THE IEEE 34-BUS FEEDER.
Bus # Home # sn [10−2] Bus # Home # sn [10−2]
802 93 15 806 171 7.7
808 187 7.9 810 252 7.5
812 370 11 814 545 0.5
816 744 8.3 818 890 6.1
820 1185 15 822 1642 7.9
824 861 6.3 826 1169 6
828 1103 11 830 1464 7.7
832 3961 8 834 6941 11
836 8597 7.9 838 9019 8.3
840 8419 5 842 8419 7.7
844 9019 7.5 846 8597 8
848 9982 6.3 850 624 8
852 2980 5 854 1718 7.5
856 2129 11 858 5129 6.3
860 8084 15 862 9982 11
864 6990 6 888 4447 8.3
890 5615 6.1
Fig. 8. Averaged f t attained by different charging schemes for Scenario 3.
Proof of Theorem 2: Proving by induction across time t,
the base case holds true since sˆ0 ∈ [s, s]. Assuming sˆt ∈ [s, s],
it will be ensured that sˆt+1 ∈ [s, s]. The analysis is performed
on a per-user basis and over three cases:
Case 1: xtn +
g
n
wn
≥ 0. Depending on the regulation signal
rt, two subcases are considered. If rt > 0, then Th. 1 asserts
that bˆtn = 0 and sˆ
t+1
n = sˆ
t
n so that the state remains feasible.
If rt < 0, then bˆtn ∈ [bn, 0] and only the lower limit on
sˆt+1n has to be ensured. To that end, substitute (22) in the
assumption for Case 1 to get sˆtn + γn +
g
n
wn
≥ 0. Combining
the last inequality with the state update sˆt+1n = sˆ
t
n+ bˆ
t
n yields:
sˆt+1n ≥ −γn −
g
n
wn
+ bˆtn. (39)
The lower limit on sˆt+1n will be satisfied if the minimum value
of the RHS in (39) is larger or equal to sn. Since bˆ
t
n ∈ [bn, 0],
the latter is guaranteed if
γn ≤ −
g
n
wn
+ bn − sn. (40)
Case 2: xtn +
gn
wn
≤ 0. If rt < 0, then Th. 1 guarantees
bˆtn = 0 and the updated state sˆ
t+1
n = sˆ
t
n remains feasible.
If rt > 0, then bˆtn ∈ [0, bn] and only the upper limit on
sˆt+1n needs to be ensured. From (22) and the assumption of
Case 2, it follows that sˆtn + γn +
gn
wn
≤ 0. Combining the last
inequality with the state update sˆt+1n = sˆ
t
n + bˆ
t
n yields:
sˆt+1n ≤ −γn −
gn
wn
+ bˆtn. (41)
The upper limit on sˆt+1n will be satisfied if the maximum value
of the RHS in (41) is smaller or equal to sn. Since bˆtn ∈ [0, bn],
the latter is guaranteed if
γn ≥ − gn
wn
+ bn − sn. (42)
Case 3: − gnwn ≤ xtn ≤ −
g
n
wn
. If rt > 0 then bˆtn ∈ [0, bn]
and only the upper limit on sˆt+1n needs to be maintained.
Substituting (22) in the second inequality of Case 3 provides
sˆtn + γn ≤ −
g
n
wn
. Substituting the state transition into the last
inequality yields:
sˆt+1n ≤ −γn −
g
n
wn
+ bˆtn (43)
The upper limit on sˆt+1n is respected if the maximum value
of the RHS in (43) is ≤ sn. Since bˆtn ∈ [0, bn], the latter is
guaranteed if
γn ≥ −
g
n
wn
+ bn − sn. (44)
Because gn > gn, the bound of (44) is tighter than the one in
(42), and thus (44) provides the lower bound on γn in (26b).
If rt < 0, then bˆtn ∈ [bn, 0] and only the lower limit on sˆt+1n
needs to be maintained. Substituting (22) in the first inequality
of Case 3 provides − gnwn ≤ sˆtn + γn. Substituting the state
transition into the last inequality yields
sˆt+1n ≥ −γn −
gn
wn
+ bˆtn. (45)
Symmetrically to (43), the lower limit on sˆt+1n is respected if
the minimum value of the RHS in (45) is larger or equal to
sn. Since bˆ
t
n ∈ [bn, 0], the latter is guaranteed if
γn ≤ − gn
wn
+ bn − sn. (46)
Since the bound of (46) is tighter than the one in (40), it is
the former that determines the upper bound on γn in (26b).
Finally, it is easy see that the condition in (26a) guarantees
that the bounds on γn in (26b) yield a non-empty interval for
all n ∈ N .
Proof of Theorem 3: Using (24), the drift plus penalty
term can be upper bounded as ∆t + E [f t(bt)|xt] ≤
E
[∑N
n=1 wnx
t
nb
t
n + f
t(bt)|xt
]
+ 12
∑N
n=1 wn max{b
2
n, b
2
n}.
Note that the sequence of charging decisions {bˆt} obtained by
(25) essentially minimizes the aforementioned bound. Hence,
the value attained for this bound by {bˆt} would be the
minimum over all feasible policies, including the stationary
policy {b`t} of Lemma 2. Then, it follows that
∆t + E
[
f t(bˆt)|xt
]
≤ φ? + 1
2
N∑
n=1
wn max{b2n, b2n}. (47)
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Summing (47) over t = 1, . . . , T ; substituting ∆t := E[Lt+1−
Lt|xt]; and applying the law of total expectation yields
E[LT −L0]+
T−1∑
t=0
E[f t(bˆt)] ≤ Tφ?+ T
2
N∑
n=1
wn max{b2n, b2n}.
Because E[LT ] ≥ 0, the previous inequality yields
T−1∑
t=0
E[f t(bˆt)] ≤ Tφ? + T
2
N∑
n=1
wn max{b2n, b2n}+ E[L0].
Since E[L0] is finite, dividing both sides by T and taking the
limit of T to infinity proves the claim.
Proof of Theorem 4: The function f t is convex quadratic
with Hessian matrix Ht := ctp(I + 11
>). The minimum
eigenvalue of Ht is λmin(Ht) = ctp. Exploiting the Rayleigh
quotient property of λmin(Ht) and using a second-order
Taylor’s series expansion of f t provides
f t(bˆt) ≥ f t(b˜t)+(bˆt− b˜t)>∇f t(b˜t)+ c
t
p
2
‖bˆt− b˜t‖22 (48)
for all t. Applying the expectation operator over the random
variables {ctp, ctr, `t,qt}; averaging over t = 1, . . . , T ; and
taking the limit of T to infinity yields
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E[f t(bˆt)] ≥ lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E[f t(b˜t)]
+ lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E[(bˆt − b˜t)>∇f t(b˜t)]
+
cp
2
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E[‖bˆt − b˜t‖22]. (49)
By the first-order optimality conditions for {b˜t}, it holds that
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E[(bˆt − b˜t)>∇f t(b˜t)] ≥ 0. (50)
Note that F ({bt}) is a functional rather than a function.
Nevertheless, it can be shown to be Fre´chet twice differen-
tiable and optimality conditions for constrained optimization
over functionals lead naturally to (50); see [38, Prop. 2.11].
Plugging (50) and the definitions of φ˜ and φˆ into (49) yields
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E[‖bˆt − b˜t‖22] ≤
2
cp
(φˆ− φ˜) ≤ 2K
cp
where the second inequality stems from (27).
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